How do I design an anti-jam GPS receiver for military applications?
Anti-Jam GPS Receiver Architecture for Military Systems
GPS is the backbone of military position, navigation, and timing (PNT), but its extremely weak signal (received power approximately -130 dBm) makes it vulnerable to intentional jamming and spoofing. Anti-jam GPS receivers are essential for virtually all military platforms.
Frequently Asked Questions
How many jammer sources can a CRPA system handle?
A CRPA with N elements can null N-1 independent jammer directions. A 7-element array handles up to 6 simultaneous jammers. Space-time processing provides additional degrees of freedom that can handle jammers with different spectral and temporal characteristics even from the same direction. Typical military CRPA systems use 4-7 elements.
What is GPS spoofing and how does a military receiver protect against it?
Spoofing is the transmission of fake GPS signals that cause the receiver to compute an incorrect position or time. Military receivers protect against spoofing by using encrypted military signals (P(Y)-code and M-code) that cannot be forged, signal authentication (checking cryptographic signatures in the navigation message), and consistency checks between GPS, inertial navigation, and other sensors. Antenna-based spoofing detection can identify signals arriving from incorrect directions.
Can a single-antenna GPS receiver be made jam-resistant?
To a limited extent. Single-antenna techniques include adaptive temporal filtering (notch filters to excise narrowband jammers), increasing the correlator integration time (trading update rate for sensitivity), and INS aiding (maintaining navigation through GPS outages using inertial sensors). However, these techniques provide only 15-25 dB of jammer rejection compared to 30-60 dB for CRPA systems.